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We develop a public choice model of the International Monetary Fund in which 
credit and conditionality are simultaneously determined by the demand for, and 
supply of, IMF credit. A graphical analysis illustrates the comparative statics in 
response to various shocks. We apply the model to explain the main changes in 
the rules governing conditionality and in the number of conditions per program. 
We observe a highly significant positive correlation between the number of 
conditions per program and the prior use of Fund credit relative to quota in 1959-
99. A panel data analysis of 206 letters of intent in 4/1997-2/2003 reveals that the 
number of conditions depends negatively on international reserves and positively 
on interest rates in the world capital market, monetary expansion in the borrowing 
country and the number of World Bank adjustment loans. Finally, the effects of 
conditionality are analyzed for the first time. Our instrumental-variables estimate 
shows that the number of conditions does not have a significant effect on any of 
the five typical instrument and target variables considered. The final section links 
the analysis of IMF conditionality with the literature on tied transfers in public 
economics and develops some novel proposals for the reform of IMF 
conditionality. 
   2
1. Introduction 
 
This paper fills five gaps in the literature on IMF conditionality. 
  First, it develops a formal public choice model of the demand for, and 
supply of, IMF output and derives the comparative-static implications for 
conditionality in a graphical analysis (Section 2).  
  Second, it tries to explain the most striking historical changes of IMF 
conditionality by inspecting the time series of the main causal variables (Section 
3.1). 
  Third, Dreher's (2003a) annual panel data analysis of the number of IMF 
conditions in 1987-99 is complemented by an analysis of disaggregated quarterly 
data for 1997-2003, distinguishing between monetary and public sector conditions 
and between performance criteria, structural benchmarks and conditions requiring 
prior action (Section 3.2). 
  Fourth, the effects of (the number of) IMF conditions on the main 
macroeconomic instrument and target variables are analyzed for the first time 
(Section 3.3). This panel data analysis is connected with Section 3.2 by an 
instrumental variables estimate (Section 3.4). 
  Finally, we link the discussion of IMF conditionality with the literature on 
institutional competition and tied transfers in public economics and derive some 
new proposals for the reform of conditionality (Section 4). 
 
2. A public-choice model of IMF conditionality 
 
Like all international organizations, the International Monetary Fund is a 
bureaucracy and ought to be analyzed as such. According to the economic theory 
of bureaucracy, bureaucrats try to maximize their budget, staff, discretion and 
amenities while they have almost no influence on their income. 
  The IMF bureaucracy does not determine the size of its administrative 
budget and its lending capacity. But the econometric evidence reveals that it tries 
to obtain quota increases by "hurry-up lending" at the time of the regular quota 
reviews and that its staff grows in line with its quota (Vaubel 1991). It has also 
been shown that the staff of international organizations expands if the financing 
share of the largest contributor (usually the United States) declines and the   3
ideological orientation of the U.S. President shifts to the left (Vaubel, Dreher, 
Soylu 2003). 
  Discretion in the case of the IMF takes two forms: the power to distribute 
and the power to regulate. The Fund decides about the distribution of its 
subsidized loans and about the conditions attached to them. 
  Thus, the utility function of the IMF bureaucracy can be written as 
(1)  U =   U(F(Q(L) + R(iF)), N(Q), L(N(Q)), C(N(Q))) +  
λ1(F(Q(L) + R(iF)) – L(N(Q)) – X) + 
λ2(B(Q) - N(Q)  * W)) 
where   F is the Fund's capacity to finance lending, 
  Q is the sum of all quota, 
  L is IMF lending, 
  R is the Fund's interest revenue, 
 i F is the interest rate charged by the Fund, 
  N is the number of IMF staff, 
  C is the stringency of IMF conditionality, 
  X is unused lending capacity (X ≤ Q), 
  B is the administrative budget (B – N * W ≥ O) and 
  W is the average wage of an IMF bureaucrat. 
 
While the Fund controls its supply of credit, the demand for its credit is 
determined by the borrowing member states. Their demand depends on the value 
of being able to use the loan, the (mostly negative) value of having to comply with 
IMF conditions and the interest subsidy offered by the Fund. The value of the loan 
and of conditionality reflects the economic and political needs of the borrowing 
governments. Their economic needs are a function of their income and, depending 
on the exchange rate regime, their international reserves or their (nominal or real) 
exchange rate. Their political needs are determined by their electoral cycle and 
their popularity. As Dreher and Vaubel (2004) show, net IMF lending tends to be 
larger before elections. Note that the value of accepting IMF conditionality need 
not be negative in all circumstances. Notably after an election, the conditions 
agreed with the Fund may be welcome to the borrowing government because they 
enable it to use the Fund as a scapegoat for the unpopular corrective policies   4
which are now required (Vaubel 1991).
1 This may explain why both the number 
and the net amount of IMF loans are significantly larger after elections (Vreeland 
1999, Vreeland, Przeworski 2000, Dreher, Vaubel 2004). 
  To summarize, the borrowers' demand for IMF loans (LD) can be written as: 
(2)   LD = LD(VL(EL,PL) + VC(C, EC, PC) + S(iF, iM)) 
where VL  is the value of being able to use the loan, 
E  is economic "need", 
  P  is political, i.e., electoral, "need", 
 V C  is the (negative or positive) value of IMF conditionality to the  
borrowing government, 
  S  is the value of the interest subsidy offered by the Fund and 
 i M  is the rate of interest which the borrowing government would have to 
    pay in the market.
2 
  The degree of conditionality which is optimal for the Fund can now be 
derived by substituting the borrowers' demand function into the Fund's utility 
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Thus, the Fund balances the marginal utility of imposing conditions on its 
borrowers against the marginal disutility of losing demand for its credits in 
response to its conditionality. 
  The trade-off between conditionality (C) and lending (L) can be depicted in 
a two-dimensional diagram, and the equilibrium can be derived. In Figure 1, the 
staff's preferences with respect to conditionality and lending are translated into 
indifference curves (I) and the borrowers' demand function (D) serves as a 
transformation curve. The optimum for the Fund and the equilibrium between 
borrowers' demand and IMF supply is the point of tangency of the best 







1 Dreher (2003b) has shown empirically that the IMF may indeed increase the incumbent's chance 
of reelection. 
2 The interest rate may be infinite, of course. 
3 See also Vaubel (1991). We refrain from computing these values.   5
  Of course, there is no reason to assume that E1 is also optimal for the world 
as a whole. Since IMF lending is subsidized, conditionality C 1
* is likely to be 
excessive. The interest subsidy enables the Fund to impose more stringent policy 
conditions than an unsubsidized lender would and could do. The Fund exerts 
regulatory power at the expense of the taxpayers of the net contributing states who 
finance the interest subsidy.  
  IMF lending cannot be larger than its lending capacity F. If the equilibrium 
amount of lending L1
* is smaller than, or equal to, F, this constraint is not effective 
(Figure 1). However, if L
*>F as in Figure 2, the Fund's optimization is constrained 
(L
*=F) and conditionality is at C which is on a lower indifference curve (I2) than 
C
*. In this case, a quota increase should not only raise lending but also reduce 
conditionality.  
Since, at the time of a quota review, the Fund uses its lending capacity 
more fully to obtain a large quota increase, its indifference curves and the point of 
tangency shift to the right (E2), i.e., closer to F, in the unconstrained case of 
Figure 1. In this case, therefore, conditionality should ceteris paribus decrease at 
the time of a quota review and rise again, thereafter. 
  Thus, if the quota review leads to a quota increase, the effect on 
conditionality depends entirely on whether the capital constraint had been 
effective or not. If lending had been constrained, conditionality diminishes. If 
lending had not been constrained, conditionality rises. 
  There may not only be a capital constraint but also a labor constraint. We 
expect that the production of policy conditions is considerably more labor-
intensive than the lending itself so that, in practice, the labor constraint may only 
be binding on conditionality. As Figure 3 shows, a labor constraint (N) reduces 
conditionality and raises lending. Conversely, in this case, an increase in staff 
raises conditionality and lowers lending. 
  The Fund's principals may not only impose a capital constraint and/or a 
labor constraint, they can also affect the rate of substitution between lending and 
conditionality in the Fund's utility function. For example, the Fund's policy 
conditions were severely criticized as misguided and excessive after the Asian 
debt crisis of 1997/98. U.S. Congress threatened to refuse ratification of the 1999 
quota increase if the Fund did not reduce the number and stringency of its policy 
conditions. Like a quota review, this pressure should have shifted the indifference   6
curve system and the point of tangency to the right as in Figure 1. Thus, ceteris 
paribus, the softening of conditionality should have been accompanied by an 
increase in lending.  
  In our graphical analysis, we now turn from the supply side to the demand 
for IMF credit. The demand function of equation (2) implies that the demand 
curve in our figure shifts outward when the borrowing countries 
–  move into recession, 
–  experience a decline in the demand for their products or in the supply of 
  their imported goods (e.g., oil), 
–  adopt fixed exchange rates (especially if the currency is overvalued), 
–  accelerate monetary expansion or increase the budget deficit because of an  
election, 
–  face rising interest rates on the world capital market, in the extreme case  
  an international debt crisis. 
When the demand for IMF credit grows, the Fund increases both lending
4 and 
conditionality
5 (Figure 4). If the demand increase is due to a recession, a negative 
terms of trade shock or a debt crisis, the hardening of conditionality is clearly 
procyclical
6 but this is what the Fund's bureaucratic interest implies. 
  So far we have treated the interest rate charged by the Fund as exogenous 
and constant. This is no longer correct. Since 1990, the rates of charge have even 
been linked to short-term market interest rates in the main industrial countries so 
that the subsidy is fairly constant for short-term loans. Ceteris paribus, an increase 
in the Fund's rate of charge reduces its conditionality (equation 2), and a rise in 
market rates increases both IMF lending and conditionality. If both rates rise in 
parallel, IMF lending and conditionality decline. 
  Thus, the Fund has three rather than two policy instruments at its disposal: 
lending, conditionality and interest rate policy. We expect that it gives more 
weight to the disadvantage that high rates of charge choke off demand for its 
lending than to the advantage that they increase its supply of loanable funds. 
Thus, in principle, the IMF bureaucracy prefers low rates of charge. But its rates 
                                                 
4 Dreher and Vaubel (2004) show that recessions, reserve losses and monetary acceleration 
significantly raise net IMF lending. 
5 Dreher's panel data analysis (2003a) for the years 1987-99 reveals that a falling current account 
balance, which may be due to a negative terms of trade shock, does indeed raise the number of 
IMF conditions. But economic growth and monetary expansion do not have a significant effect on 
conditionality.   7
of charge cannot be zero by the Articles of Agreement. If we view interest rate 
policy as a matter of negotiation between the Fund and its principals, we would 
expect that the Fund does not resist an interest rate hike demanded by its 
principals, if both the capital and the labor constraint are binding and that, by 
implication, rates of charge are likely to be higher, the more the Fund's quota and 
manpower potential have been exhausted.  
  In the longer term, as per capita income grows in the borrowing countries, 
the demand curve will not only shift in parallel (e.g., from D1 to D2) but also turn 
more elastic (like D3) because the borrowing governments enjoy easier access to 
the world capital market and become more sensitive to interference from the 
Fund. Moreover, with education improving, the Fund's conditions may be 
increasingly resented by the citizens of these countries. If democracy is gaining 
ground, the governments of such emerging countries will also have to pay more 
attention to the unpopularity of IMF conditions. As the demand curve flattens, the 
Fund will lower conditionality and raise lending, if possible (E3 in Figure 4). 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1. Explaining the most striking changes of IMF conditionality 
 
When the International Monetary Fund was founded in 1944, its statutes (The 
Articles of Agreement) did not provide for conditionality. In the negotiations, the 
British delegation, led by J.M. Keynes, was opposed to conditionality because 
Britain was likely to be a borrower. 
  But in March 1948, under U.S. pressure, the Board of Executive Directors 
decided that the Fund could attach strings to its loans, and in 1951, it defined 
some criteria. In 1956, the "phasing" of credit instalments was introduced to 
strengthen the incentive for complying with the conditions. However, the 
Compensatory Financing Facility, introduced in 1963, lightened the burden of 
conditionality. In 1968, a review of conditionality, supported by the U.S., tried to 
limit the scope of the Fund's performance clauses. In 1974, conditionality was 
extended from policy targets to policy instruments (Gould 2001: 9). In 1979, 
mounting criticism of IMF conditions led to another review of conditionality. As 
Gould (2003) documents in considerable detail, the driving force behind the 
                                                                                                                                      
6 Cooper (1983) has criticized the Fund for varying its conditionality procyclically.   8
expansion of conditionality had been the IMF staff, and the two reviews of 
conditionality were (rather unsuccessful) attempts of the Executive Board to limit 
conditionality. 
  In the 1980s, supply side conditions, notably sector-specific conditions, 
were added. In 1982, the Compensatory and Contingency Facility was redesigned 
making it a high-conditionality facility. The Structural Adjustment Facility (1986) 
and especially the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (1987), which 
successively took its place, introduced far-reaching "structural benchmark" 
conditions. The Systemic Transformation Facility (1993-95) was associated with 
light conditionality. In 2000, under strong public pressure, the Fund embarked on 
another review of conditionality and, in September 2002, the Executive Board 
approved new guidelines which demanded more uniform rules and restraint of 
conditionality. 
  As it is impossible to measure and compare the stringency of particular 
conditions in an objective way, we first focus on these events and the time series 
of the number of conditions per program. We try to explain them in the 
framework of our model. 
  The arrows in column 1 of Table 1 indicate the main changes in the rules 
governing conditionality. Column 2 reports the number of performance criteria 
per program from three different sources (1952-94: Gould 2001; 1995-99: 
Goldstein 2000; 2000-02: our computations).
7 The other columns contain most of 
the key explanatory variables of the model. 
  The decision in 1951 to define conditionality criteria is not easily explained 
by the demand for, or potential supply of, IMF credit. The use of Fund credit was 
low (even considering that very few of the members' currencies were convertible). 
Probably, the criteria of 1951 were simply a consequence of the U.S. initiative of 
1948. 
  The case of 1956 is more interesting. Economic growth was rapidly 
decelerating (column 8) and the use of Fund credit quadrupled both absolutely and 
relative to quota (though at a low level). The quota review of 1955 (column 6) had 
failed to provide more resources for the Fund. With the demand for credit rising 
                                                 
7 Other studies confirm the trend increase in the number of conditions per program but do not 
report annual data. According to Polak (1991: 14), the average number of performance criteria per 
arrangement was under six from 1968 to 1977, about seven in 1974 to 1984 and 9.5 from 1984 to 
1987. Schadler et al. (1995) count 15 in 1988-92. See also Beveridge, Kelly (1980), Killick (1992) 
and Dreher (2002).   9
and the supply of credit constrained, the Fund's interest in conditionality 
increased. 
  Column 2 reports a monotonic increase in the number of actual policy 
conditions from 1958 to 1969. This is consistent with the strong positive trend in 
the use of Fund credit which rose from 3 percent of quota in 1960/61 to 19 percent 
in 1969.
8 The demand for IMF credit grew rapidly because more and more 
developing countries joined the IMF and because market interest rates (nominal 
and real) soared (column 10) while the Fund's basic rates of charge stayed at very 
low levels (column 9). IMF staff more than doubled in this period so that there 
should have been no labor constraint. The introduction of the Compensatory 
Financing Facility in 1963, which offered low conditionality, occurred at a time 
when the use of Fund Credit relative to quota had temporarily declined. 
  From 1969 to 1973 the number of conditions dropped to a lower level and 
the use of Fund credit declined. To some extent, this may have been a response to 
the 1968 review of conditionality. An alternative explanation is that the quota 
increase of 1970 removed the supply constraint and reduced the Fund's interest in 
conditionality relative to lending. Moreover, the collapse of the adjustable peg 
system reduced the demand for IMF credit.
9  
  The extension of conditionality from 1974 onward is accompanied by a 
strong increase in IMF lending both absolutely and relative to quota because the 
oil price shock of 1973 triggered a world recession in 1974/75 and raised the 
demand for IMF credit. It is interesting to note that the Fund reacted not only by 
strengthening its conditionality but also by suddenly raising its rates of charge in 
1974. To some extent, this may also have been motivated by the rise of market 
interest rates in 1973/74. The decision in 1974 to extend the scope of 
conditionality was followed by a monotonic increase in the number of conditions 
up to 1987. The Fund made use of its larger conditionality powers because its 
quota were increasingly exhausted, especially in 1976-77 at the time of the 
seventh quota review.
10 Staff size increased almost monotonically so that there 
was probably no binding labor constraint. 
                                                 
8 The temporary decline from 1957/58 to 1959/60 is due to the quota increase of 1959 and follows 
the hurry-up lending preceding it. 
9 World Bank conditionality was also weak for this reason (Kapur et al. 1997: 463). 
10 The Board of Governors adopted their resolution in 1978.   10
  Contrary to expectations, the review of conditionality initiated in 1979 did 
neither produce more restrictive guidelines nor stop the increase in the number of 
conditions because demand for IMF credit remained strong thanks to the second 
oil price shock (1979), high and rising market interest rates (1979-81), the world 
recession of 1981/82 and the ensuing Latin American debt crisis of 1982/83. 
  The reform of the Compensatory and Contingency Facility in 1982, making 
it a high-conditionality facility, occurred at a time of high and rising use of Fund 
Credit, both absolutely and relative to quota, due to the debt crisis. 
  The introduction of structural benchmark conditions in 1986 occurred at a 
time of still very high use of, and demand for, Fund credit. But market interest 
rates were falling rapidly. The new Structural and Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Loans, carrying very low interest, enabled the Fund to maintain the 
demand for its credit and add a new type of condition.
11 
  The number of conditions was slightly lower and fairly constant from 1989 
to 1995. This is consistent with the generally declining ratio of the use of Fund 
credit to quota. The Systemic Transformation Facility (1993-95), with its weak 
conditionality, was introduced after the huge quota increase of 1992, which 
reduced the ratio of Fund Credit to quota, and it was terminated at a time of 
strongly rising Fund credit relative to quota. 
  The Asian debt crisis of 1997 temporarily raised the demand for IMF credit, 
and both the use of Fund credit and the number of conditions temporarily 
increased. 
  The review of conditionality beginning in 2000 was acceptable to the Fund 
because quota had been drastically increased in 1999, and the use of Fund credit 
was falling. As in 1970-73, the low number of conditions in 2000-02 may, 
therefore, not be due to the review of conditionality but the low use of Fund credit 
relative to quota that followed the quota increase.  
  In sum, our inspection of the data generally confirms the prediction of our 
model that conditionality increases when the demand for IMF credit grows 
relative to quota and that conditionality decreases or stagnates when the demand 
for IMF credit is weak or IMF quota have been raised. If the number of conditions 
in 1959-99 is simply regressed on the use of Fund credit relative to quota in the 
                                                 
11 The Fund also feared that some countries would default on their loans from the IMF if they 
could not borrow on more concessional terms (Dreher 2003a).   11
previous year, a correlation coefficient of .71 results. This is, of course, 
significantly different from zero at the one percent level. 
  We now turn to a rigorous econometric analysis of more recent panel data. 
 
3.2. An econometric analysis of the determinants of conditionality 
 
In our econometric analysis, we focus on the number of conditions included in 
206 IMF letters of intent with 38 countries between October 1997 and March 
2003.
12 Thus, our panel data are dominated by the cross-sectional dimension. 
Table 2 summarizes the number of conditions by type and sector. As can be seen, 
the programs analyzed include more than 22 conditions on average. We also show 
the summary statistics for transition countries only. The average program with 
countries in transition contains slightly more conditions – this is true for 
performance criteria and, especially, for prior actions. 
We estimate pooled time-series cross-section regressions to identify the 
determinants of conditionality. Since our data are strongly skewed to the right, 
OLS regressions would be clearly inappropriate. We estimate our model using 
Poisson regressions even though our data are displaying signs of overdispersion. 
The relevant tests reveal that not all of our dependent variables follow the Poisson 
distribution, so in some cases negative binomial regression might be preferable. 
The results, however, are almost identical. We therefore report only the Poisson 
regressions. 
Since some of the (quarterly) data are not available for all countries or 
periods, the panel data are unbalanced and the number of observations depends on 
the choice of explanatory variables. To account for time-invariant unobservable 
heterogeneity potentially correlated with the regressors, we use country dummies. 
We also include a dummy for each quarter of the year (“fixed time effects”). All 
additional variables, their data sources and summary statistics are listed in the 
appendix. 
                                                 
12 The letters have been randomly selected from the Fund’s webpage: www.imf.org. 23 of the 
countries covered by this study received loans under the Fund's Standby Arrangement or Extended 
Fund Facility, 18 countries received PRGF loans.   12
Table 3 contains estimates of the complete model for the total number of 
conditions. Most explanatory variables have already been used in Dreher 
(2003a).
13 
Column 1 starts by testing the hypotheses derived from public choice 
theory. As has been shown by Dreher (2003a) one important possibility to explain 
changes in conditionality over time and across countries is the changing 
relationship between the IMF and the World Bank. With the inception of the 
Fund’s Extended Facility in 1974 and the Bank’s Structural Adjustment Loans in 
1980, the demarcation line between Bank and Fund became blurred. In the 
eighties, Fund and Bank were rivals in adjustment lending. In some cases, the 
Bank supported countries in spite of negative Fund evaluations.
14 The Fund 
therefore faced the risk of losing its clients if the Bank marketed its 
macroeconomic programs with softer conditionality. To avoid this kind of 
competition and contradictory advice the IMF tried to press for more cooperation 
(Polak, 1994: 39). IMF and World Bank started to send members of their staff to 
each other's mission teams. This raised the bargaining power of those teams and 
the scope for conditionality. If the relation between Fund and Bank is collusive 
rather than competitive, we expect the number of IMF conditions to be higher, the 
higher the World Bank’s contemporaneous involvement in the country.
15 That is 
why we include the number of new contemporaneous World Bank structural, 
technical and all other arrangements, respectively. 
We also allow for the country’s real GDP. If IMF staff is interested in 
enforcing as many conditions as possible, they negotiate a more stringent program 
if the country is in a weak bargaining position. The more a government needs a 
loan, the smaller is its power to enforce its own agenda in negotiations with the 
IMF. Moreover, the country’s bargaining power is influenced by other countries’ 
willingness to support the potential borrower (Bird and Rowlands, 2003). Both the 
applicant's own (direct) influence in the Fund and the support from other countries 
rise with its GDP. A country which has a large GDP possesses a large quota, 
which means higher voting rights, and it is more important for the world 
                                                 
13 The exceptions are real GDP growth, LIBOR, the government’s budget deficit and changes in 
international reserves. Dreher (2003a) additionally uses principal arrears, US military grants and 
loans, public and publicly guaranteed bilateral and commercial debt, an index measuring 
democracy and an index measuring economic freedom. We cannot employ those variables here 
since they are not available on a quarterly basis. 
14 In 1988 this was the case for Argentina and Turkey (Polak, 1994: 37).   13
economy. Thus, a country with a large GDP must probably accept fewer 
conditions. 
We employ the following additional variables (with their lagged values): 
-  The country’s real GDP growth, since higher growth increases the 
probability that the IMF program will be successful. IMF staff may be 
more interested to negotiate arrangements with growing countries – 
this makes the IMF look more successful as well. Staff should thus be 
willing to demand fewer conditions. 
-  Real GDP growth in the OECD countries, because the Fund has more 
power to enforce conditions in recessions (section 2). 
-  The LIBOR on three months credits to US banks, since the interest rate 
subsidy provided by the Fund is higher with higher world interest rates 
– and demand for Fund credits should therefore rise (section 2). 
In Table 3, only four variables have a significant influence: IMF programs 
include more conditions when fewer technical loans have been granted by the 
World Bank, real GDP is low and real per capita GDP growth has been high in the 
borrowing countries and in the OECD countries. Bargaining power of the 
recipient government thus seems to be important in negotiations with the Fund. 
The results also show that, with respect to per capita GDP growth in OECD 
countries, the counter-cyclical effect dominates. The positive coefficient of real 
GDP growth and the negative coefficient of technical loans are surprising. 
However, both coefficients become insignificant when we include variables from 
normative theory. Since, e.g., high rates of monetary expansion and huge budget 
deficits often coincide with low growth rates, the coefficient of real GDP growth 
probably reflects the joint effect of those variables. The coefficient of technical 
loans is due to an outlier with only one technical project and a number of 
conditions more than twice the average. If this outlier – South Korea – is excluded 
from the sample, the coefficient becomes completely insignificant. 
We also introduced a dummy for transition countries (and omitted the 
fixed country effects) to test whether the high demand of those countries for IMF 
loans allowed Fund staff to ask for more conditions. The dummy is, however, 
completely insignificant. We do therefore not report it in the table. 
                                                                                                                                      
15 For a more detailed discussion see Dreher (2002, 2003a).   14
The second column includes variables from normative rather than public 
choice theory (all lagged by one quarter). From a normative perspective, the IMF 
should be more demanding, the worse the borrowing country’s policies. 
Traditionally, the IMF focuses on government consumption, the government’s 
budget deficit, the country’s current account balance and its rate of monetary 
growth. Regardless of economic policy, the Fund should ask for more conditions, 
the greater the volume of loans provided relative to the country’s quota. This is 
official Fund procedure since 1955. We also include the percentage change in 
international reserves. Inflows of reserves are expected to reduce the number of 
conditions because fewer reforms are needed to surmount the crisis.
16 
The results show that a high rate of monetary expansion leads to 
significantly more conditions while government consumption, the government’s 
budget deficit, the country’s current account balance (all in percent of GDP), the 
percentage change in international reserves and new IMF credit (in percent of the 
country’s quota) are insignificant.  
The third column includes all normative and public choice variables. As 
can be seen, real GDP, real per capita GDP growth in OECD countries and 
monetary expansion still influence the number of conditions significantly. The 
World Bank’s technical loans no longer influence conditionality while its 
Structural Adjustment Loans now significantly increase the number of conditions. 
The influence of LIBOR is now significant at the ten percent level, with the 
expected sign. 
Table 4 replicates the analysis for different types of conditions. However, 
we only report regressions including variables from both normative and public 
choice theory. We do not include prior actions in the table, since our number of 
observations is too small for meaningful regressions. As can be seen, the results 
regarding economic policy are rather mixed, with no clear patterns emerging. The 
exception is monetary expansion which is significant at the five percent level in 
three regressions. Actually, monetary growth is most important in IMF programs 
(Dreher 2002, 2003c). Confirming the results of Table 3, real GDP growth in the 
OECD countries does not lead to fewer but more conditions. Greater power of the 
                                                 
16 This variable also has a public choice interpretation: Since inflows of reserves give the 
borrowing country greater independence from the Fund’s resources, they increase the recipient 
government’s power in the negotiations and should thus reduce the number of conditions.   15
recipient country, as measured by its real GDP, reduces the number of conditions 
in the monetary sector as well as the structural benchmarks (total and monetary). 
 
3.3. The effects of conditionality on target and instrument variables 
 
As a next step and for the first time, we analyze the effect of IMF conditionality 
on a number of policy target or instrument variables which are typically included 
as performance criteria in IMF programs: monetary growth, the government’s 
budget deficit, the current account balance, the change in international reserves 
and government spending.
17 As explanatory variables we employ similar 
covariates as in our earlier analysis of fiscal and monetary policy (Dreher and 
Vaubel 2004). Table 5 reports the results. It omits the coefficients of new net 
credit provided by the IMF, the exhaustion of a country’s quota with the Fund at 
the beginning of the period, the rate of inflation, real GDP growth and the lagged 
endogenous variable which were also included. Conditionality is again measured 
by the number of conditions included in IMF letters of intent. We run five 
regressions for each dependent variable. Once more, we start by using the sum of 
all conditions. We then separate the total number into monetary and public-sector 
conditions. We distinguish performance criteria, structural benchmarks and prior 
actions. 
As Table 5 shows, IMF conditionality seems to be rather ineffective. 
Budget deficits and international reserves are not correlated with IMF 
conditionality at all. Monetary performance criteria increase the rate of monetary 
expansion. This positive correlation could be due to reverse causation though we 
did not find a significant correlation in the regressions reported in Table 4. We 
will deal with this in the next section. 
According to the estimates, conditionality is most effective in increasing 
the current account balance. The total number of conditions as well as several sub-
aggregates are significantly correlated with higher current account balances. The 
                                                 
17 To the best of our knowledge, the number of conditions has never been used as an explanatory 
variable in studies investigating the effects of the Fund. Usually, Fund influence is proxied either 
by the number of programs concluded or the amount of loans drawn. Boockmann and Dreher 
(2003) used both variables to analyze the effect of the IMF on economic freedom. In employing 
the number of programs in addition to new loans, they try to distinguish the effects of 
conditionality from the increased leeway due to IMF money. A summary of studies investigating 
the effect of the IMF on the current account balance, the rate of inflation, and real GDP growth is 
provided by Dreher (2003c: Table V.1).   16
disaggregated analysis shows that structural benchmarks are mainly responsible 
for this relationship.  
Of course, if conditionality depends on targets and the target variables 
depend on conditionality, taking the number of conditions and, respectively, the 
economic variables as exogenous regressors is flawed and the results would be 
biased. The next section deals with possible endogeneity of some of the right hand 
side regressors. 
 
3.4. An instrumental-variables approach 
 
In this section we replicate the analysis presented in Tables 4 and 5 using 
instruments and thus controlling for potential endogeneity of our variables. Again 
we start by explaining the number of IMF conditions. This time we instrument 
government consumption, the government’s budget deficit, monetary expansion, 
the change in international reserves and the current account balance with all 
variables determining them in the regressions reported in Table 5 (specification I). 
Once more, we report results from a regression with all variables included. Again 
we do not report results for prior actions since our number of observations is too 
small for a meaningful regression. Nor do we report results for performance 
criteria because we did not obtain significant coefficients. 
As Table 6 shows, most results confirm the previous analysis. The 
analyzed letters of intent include significantly more conditions when the World 
Bank negotiated more adjustment loans. This is true for the total number of 
conditions as well as for conditions in the monetary sector. As explained, this is 
probably because Fund and Bank staff use existing Bank material when they 
jointly prepare IMF programs. In 1997-2003, the Fund-Bank relationship has been 
collusive rather than competitive. IMF staff include part of the Bank’s conditions 
into their IMF programs. The influence is, however, quantitatively small. An 
additional adjustment program raises, all else equal, the number of conditions by 
about one half. 
As expected, LIBOR has a significantly positive effect on the number of 
conditions. At the five percent level of significance, more international reserves 
lead to fewer conditions. Monetary expansion now significantly increases the 
number of conditions in four regressions but our results for the other policy and   17
target variables are usually not in line with our a priori hypotheses. Surprisingly, 
government consumption significantly reduces the number of conditions in all but 
one of the regressions. Large government consumption usually comes along with 
larger and more powerful bureaucracies. Possibly, they become so strong that they 
can influence negotiations with the Fund and prevent conditions which harm their 
interests (Dreher 2003d). 
In Table 7 we instrument conditionality with the variables explaining IMF 
conditions in Table 3 (column 3). At the five or one percent level, IMF conditions 
never have a significant effect on the targets and instruments of the recipient 
governments.
18 The number of conditions simply does not matter for economic 
policy outcomes. 
This raises the obvious question why the Fund is so interested in imposing 
policy conditions. Does it have illusions about their effectiveness?
19 Does it use 
conditionality merely as a pretext to justify a large staff? Or is the number of 
policy conditions a poor indicator of the stringency of conditionality? 
 
4. Reforming conditionality 
 
The controversy about IMF (and World Bank) conditionality is analogous to the 
long-standing debate about tied transfers in public economics. Should transfers to 
the poor be subject to restrictions on their use? In the case of the Fund, the 
transfer or aid is the subsidy implied by the difference between the IMF rate of 
charge and the interest rate which the borrowing government would have to pay 
on the capital market. 
                                                 
18 This is in line with previous research. Using Fund Programs as a proxy, Boockmann and Dreher 
(2003) find that conditionality does not influence economic freedom. Evrensel (2003) comes to the 
conclusion that IMF programs do not improve monetary or fiscal policies either. 
19 Bird (2003) argues that the Fund may be tricked by the borrowing governments who take the 
money and then renege on their commitments, knowing that the Fund is not interested to stop 
lending to them. Thus, the Fund faces a time inconsistency problem which, given its bureaucratic 
incentives, it cannot solve. To be effective, conditionality would have to be enforced by an 
external actor (Vaubel 1991: 233).  
Bird (2003: 97-100) also considers the following explanation of the ineffectiveness of IMF 
agreements. The Fund is only interested in a large budget and, as a means to this, in much lending. 
It does not wish conditionality to be effective because effective conditionality would reduce IMF 
lending by deterring potential borrowers or by improving their policies. The Fund negotiates 
policy conditions merely to please its main principals, the net contributors, who do not realize that 
conditionality is ineffective. This story is implausible because the three reviews of conditionality 
have been initiated by the main principals asking a reluctant staff (agent) to reduce conditionality 
(Gould 2003). Bird also rejects this explanation but for different reasons.   18
  Tied transfers have been criticized by most economists because they prevent 
the recipients from maximizing their utility, are of uncertain value within any 
framework of redistribution and cause large administrative cost. 
  However, tied transfers have also been defended on the following grounds: 
1. Utility maximization must also allow for the donors' preferences (e.g., 
Buchanan 1968, Garfinkel 1973). 
2.  The recipients, too, may prefer tied transfers because they do not want to be 
treated simply as poor. They prefer transfers justified by some higher purpose. 
3.  If the transfers are paid to households, notably families with children, the 
donors ought to make sure that the father or the parents do not abuse the 
money. There may be principal-agent problems within the family. 
4.  The restrictions prevent the recipient from abusing the money so as to remain 
dependent on further transfers (Bruce, Waldman 1991, Vaubel 1991). In other 
words, conditionality addresses the problem of ex-post moral hazard. 
5.  If the transfers are tied in an appropriate way, they will be demanded only by 
the truly needy (Nichols, Zeckhauser 1982). Thus, the restrictions may serve 
to solve the donors' selection problem in conditions of asymmetrically 
imperfect information. 
Unlike the World Bank, the Fund was never meant to provide development 
aid. Its purpose was to supply temporary balance of payments credits in the 
absence of an integrated world capital market. If the liberalization of international 
capital movements and the collapse of the adjustable peg system of Bretton 
Woods has removed the rationale for IMF lending (as many believe), any 
arguments about conditionality are, of course, redundant or at best "second best". 
But let us take them seriously and relate them to the literature on tied transfers. 
  The first argument is easily disposed of: truly benevolent donors would 
respect the recipients' preferences. 
  In the case of the Fund, the "higher purpose" assumed by the second 
argument would be "development" or "the stability of the international monetary 
and financial system". But development should better be left to the World Bank, 
and very few of the IMF's credits actually serve the purpose of maintaining the 
stability of the world monetary or financial system. 
  The principal-agent problem emphasized by the third argument applies 
mainly in the case of non-democratic countries. It implies that the Fund ought to   19
waive conditionality when the recipient country is a democracy. Whether a 
country is a democracy or not must not be decided by the IMF staff because it has 
a vested interest in conditionality and lending. The decision ought to be delegated 
to an institution containing a majority of democratic countries. 
  If moral hazard is the problem (argument 4), the current practice of IMF 
conditionality is clearly inadequate. To facilitate public scrutiny, the conditions 
ought to be few and simple, and they ought to be published without exception 
(Vaubel 1991). The Fund should also be obliged to inform the public whether the 
conditions have been implemented and, if not, why additional installments of the 
credit have been paid out. To keep the recipients fully responsible, the conditions 
ought to be confined to instruments which they control and exclude target 
variables which are largely beyond their control.
20 But transparency and self-
restraint are not in the bureaucratic interest of the IMF staff. 
  Moreover, moral hazard arises not only ex post, i.e., after the damage has 
occurred – it may also be a cause of the crisis. Ex-ante moral hazard requires ex 
ante conditionality (Vaubel 1991, IFIAC 2000). Ex ante monitoring also solves 
the selection problem stressed by the fifth argument. 
  The Fund's new Contingent Credit Line (CCL) established in 1999 and 
expired in 2003 provided for ex ante conditionality. But it had been designed in 
such a way that it could not function. To be eligible, the potential borrowers had 
to sign up in advance, thereby signaling that they anticipate a crisis and a need for 
credit. To be effective, ex ante conditionality has to be mandatory and universal. 
But the IMF staff is not interested in effective ex ante conditionality because it 
would reduce the demand for its lending much more than the present system of ex 
post conditionality does. (In our figure, the transition from ex post conditionality 
to effective ex ante conditionality would cause the demand function to flatten and 
shift to the left. The new point of tangency would be on a lower IMF indifference 
curve.) U.S. Congress imposed the Contingent Credit Line on the Fund, and the 
Fund found a way to render it impracticable.  
  If the Fund continues to formulate policy conditions, they should not be 
coordinated with the World Bank. The economic theory of bureaucracy and the 
literature on institutional competition demonstrate that competition among public 
agencies reduces bureaucratic waste (e.g., Niskanen 1970), improves respect for   20
regional differences in preferences (Tiebout 1961), serves as a discovery 
procedure (Hayek 1968), strengthens democratic control ("voice") and protects 
minorities by facilitating "exit" (Hirschman 1970). If the Fund and the Bank had 
to abandon their collusion, each recipient country could chose the institution and 
conditions most appropriate for it. The diversity of conditions and the comparison 
among policy experiments and their outcomes would set a learning process in 
motion. And regulatory competition would induce the Fund and the Bank to 
abandon the excessive degree of conditionality which the subsidization of credit 
and their bureaucratic incentives have brought about.
21 
                                                                                                                                      
20 This has also been demanded by Vaubel (1991), IFIAC (2000) and the Board of Executive 
Directors in September 2002. 
21 A comprehensive statement of the case against policy coordination is Vaubel (1983, 1985, 
1988). The case against coordination between Fund and Bank conditionality is developed in 
Dreher (2002).   21
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Table 1 
Variables affecting IMF conditionality 
 conditiona-
lity 
use of Fund 
credit 














  ∆ No.                 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
1950      -    0.2  8.0  .02 x 444 n.a.  0.5 1.2
51  ↑    -    0.2  8.1  .02 457 8  0.5 1.6
52      -    0.2  8.7  .02 447 2  1.0 1.8
53      -    0.2  8.7  .02 417 7  1.0 1.9
54      0    0.1  8.7  .01 405 2  2.0 1.0
55      -    0.1  8.8  .01 (x) 412 7  2.0 1.7
56  ↑    0    0.4  8.9  .04 410 4  2.0 2.7
57      0    1.0  9.0  .11 400 4  2.0 3.3
58      0    1.1  9.2  .12 400 0  2.0 1.8
59      2    0.4  14.0  .03 x 409 6  2.0 3.4
1960        2.2    0.4  14.7  .03 427 5  2.0 2.9
61        2.5    1.4  15.0  .09 445 4.3  2.0 2.4
62      3    1.0  15.2  .07 475 5.3  2.0 2.8
63  ↓      3.8    1.1  15.6  .07 500 5.0  2.0 3.2
64      4    1.4  15.8  .09 x 553 6.1  2.0 3.6
65      4    3.0  16.0  .19 643 5.6  2.0 4.0
66        4.5    3.0  20.6  .15 705 5.3  2.0 4.9
67      5    2.5  21.0  .12 804 3.7  2.0 4.3
68        5.5    3.7  21.2  .18 896 5.4  2.0 5.4
69      6    4.0  21.3  .19 x 952 5.5  2.0 6.7
1970        5.5    3.2  28.4  .11 1,038 3.4  2.0 6.4
71      5    1.3  28.8  .04 1,133 4.0  2.0 4.3
72      5    1.1  29.2  .04 1,187 5.5  2.0 4.1
73      5    1.0  29.2  .03 1,230 6.2  2.0 7.0
74  ↑      5.3    3.7  29.2  .13 x 1,302 1.6  2-4 7.9
75        5.7    7.4  29.2  .25 x 1,353 1.0  4.0 5.8
76      6  12.6  29.2  .43 x 1,379 4.9  4.0 5.0
77      7  13.2  29.2  .45 x 1,397 4.4  4.4 5.3
78        7.3  11.1  39.0  .28 x 1,394 4.5  4.4 7.2
79  ↑      7.7    9.3  39.0  .24 1,405 3.3  4.4 10.0
1980      8  11.1  59.6  .19 1,424 2.0  4.4 11.6
81      8  16.4  60.7  .27 x 1,461 1.6  6.2 14.1
82  ↑      8.5  22.3  61.1  .36 x 1,520 0.5  6.6 10.7  25
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
83   10  32.8  88.5  .37 1,554 2.6  6.6 8.6
84      10.3  37.7  89.3  .42 1,607 4.5  7.0 9.4
85      10.7  37.7  89.3  .42 1,646 3.5  7.0 7.5
86  ↑ 11  35.3  90.0  .39 1,685 3.6  6.4 6.0
87  ↑    11.7  30.6  90.0  .34 x 1,667 3.9  6.0 5.8
88      11.7  26.5  90.0  .29 x 1,652 4.7  6.6 6.7
89      11.2  24.6  90.0  .27 x 1,691 3.4  7.4 8.1
1990      11.1  23.3  91.1  .26 x 1,731 2.4  8.4 7.5
91      11.2  26.7  91.2  .29 1,763 1.3  7.1 5.4
92      11.5  27.8  141.4  .20 x 1,861 2.0  6.0 3.5
93  ↓    11.2  29.2  144.8  .20 x 2,021 2.5  4.9 3.0
94   11  30.2  144.9  .21 x 2,368 3.7  4.9 4.3
95  ↑ (11)  41.6  145.3  .29 x 2,588 3.5  4.9 5.5
96   (13)  42.1  145.3  .29 x 2,927 4.6  4.2 5.0
97   (16)  52.6  145.3  .36 x 2,904 4.2  4.3 5.1
98   (11)  66.8  145.3  .46 2,941 2.5  4.4 4.8
99   (10)  57.5  210.2  .27 3,006 3.5  3.9 4.7
2000  ↓ (8.8)  49.4  210.7  .23 3,082 4.3  5.0 5.8
01   (8.5)  59.9  212.4  .28 3,190   3.9 3.4
02   (9.1)  70.5  212.7  .33 x  
   26
Definitions and sources of Table 1: 
 
(  1)  see text 
(  2)  1952-94: number of binding conditions (performance criteria) per program 
started in that year (Gould 2001, Graph 1):  
1995-2002: average number of performance criteria per program (1995-99: 
Goldstein 2000, Table 4; 2000-02: our data base of Sections 3.2-4) 
(  3)  use of Fund credit and use of Fund administrative resources, in billions of 
SDRs (IMF 2003) 
(  4)  quota, end of year, in billions of SDRs (IMF 2003) 
(  5)  The parentheses for 1955 indicate that the quota review did not lead to a 
quota increase. 
(  6)  Annual Reports of Board of Executive Directors (IMF) 
(  7)  end of fiscal year, Annual Reports of Board of Executive Directors (IMF) 
(  8)  1951-95: real GNP (1951-60 GATT, 1961-95 IMF), 
1996-2000: GDP volume index (IMF-IFS) 
(  9)  1950-74: IMF, Policy Development and Review and Treasurer's 
Departments, Review of Fund Facilities, Further Considerations: 
Supplementary Information on Rates of Charge (2000): one year credits in 
the first credit tranche, 
1975-89: Annual Reports of the Board of Executive Directors, IMF, Fiscal 
Years, 
1990-2001: Annual Reports, Calendar Years 
(10)  International Financial Statistics (IMF) 
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Table 2: IMF conditionality, Summary Statistics (4/1997-2/2003) 
  all countries  transition countries 
  mean median min max mean median min max 
all conditions  22.19  18.5  5  102  23.33  20  6  58 
performance  criteria  8.96  8 3  21  9.63  9 5  18 
structural  benchmarks  10.70  7 0  94  8.85  8 0  30 
prior  actions  2.56  0 0  39  4.85  3 0  39 
monetary  sector,  total 7.32  5 0  79  5.65  5 0  18 
public sector, total  5.62  5  0  23  6.83  6  1  23 
monetary sector, 
    performance criteria 
2.78  3 0  7  2.85  3 0  5 
public sector, 
    performance criteria 
2.15  2 0  10  2.24  2 0  8 
monetary sector, 
    structural benchmarks 
4.11  1 0  75  2.02  1 0  6 
public sector, 
    structural benchmarks 
2.46  2 0  20  2.67  2 0  8 
monetary  sector,  0.39  0 0  9  0.78  0 0  9 
    prior actions                 
public sector,  
     prior actions 
1.02  0 0  15  1.91  1 0  15 
number of countries  38  13 
letters of intent  206  50   28
Table 3: Total number of IMF Conditions (panel data, 1997-2003, poisson, 
fixed effects) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
world bank adjustment loans  -0.05    0.14 
 (0.12)    (2.12**) 
world bank other loans  0.004    -0.03 
 (0.14)    (0.89) 
world bank technical loans  -0.36    -0.08 
 (3.65*)    (0.55) 
real GDP  -0.02    -0.03 
     (3.48*)    (4.27*) 
real GDP growth (t-1)  0.01    0.001 
 (2.97*)    (0.09) 
real per capita GDP growth in OECD   0.57    0.59 
    countries (t-1)  (6.06*)    (5.11*) 
LIBOR (t-1)  0.07    0.11 
 (1.56)    (1.85
o) 
government consumption (in percent of     0.04  -0.01 
     GDP, t-1)    (1.46)  (0.35) 
government budget deficit (in percent of    0.01  0.004 
     GDP, t-1)    (1.44)  (0.06) 
monetary expansion (percent, t-1)    0.01  0.01 
   (4.96*)  (4.58*) 
change in international reserves (t-1)    -0.001  -0.002 
   (0.56)  (0.97) 
current account balance (in percent of GDP, t-1)    0.003  -0.01 
   (0.43)  (0.90) 
new net IMF credit (in percent of quota, t-1)    0.0004  -0.0004 
   (1.42)  (0.74) 
      
log likelihood  -401.09  -268.60  -250.76 
number of countries  29  20  19 
number of observations  140  94  92 
 
Notes: 
z-statistics in parentheses 
Levels of significance: 1 percent (*), 5 percent (**), 10 percent (
o)    29 
Table 4: Number of IMF Conditions (panel data, 1997-2003, poisson, fixed effects) 
  all conditions  performance criteria  structural benchmarks 
          monetary public total monetary  monetary public  public total
world bank adjustment loans  0.03  0.20  0.05  -0.02  0.07  0.11  -0.11  0.15 
world bank other loans  -0.01  0.03  -0.03  -0.14  0.09  -0.02  -0.004  -0.06 
world bank technical loans  -0.30  0.06  -0.04  -0.07  0.25  -0.28  -0.93** 0.14 
real GDP  -0.02** -0.01  0.001  0.02  0.02  -0.08* -0.06** -0.04 
real GDP growth (t-1)  0.003  0.01  0.01  -0.02  0.003 0.01  0.01  0.06* 
real per capita GDP growth in OECD   0.80*  0.36  -0.04  0.20  -0.31  1.36* 1.45*  0.52 
    countries (t-1)                 
LIBOR (t-1)  0.16  -0.20
o             
               
   
       
         
       
-0.03 -0.23 -0.21 0.09 0.27 -0.16
government consumption (in percent of GDP, t-1) -0.06 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.12 0.20* -0.38* -0.19
government budget deficit (in percent of GDP, t-1) 0.12  -0.003  -0.01  -0.01  0.01  -0.02
o 0.04** -0.01 
monetary expansion (percent, t-1)  0.002  0.02*  0.003  -0.01  0.002 0.02* -0.01  0.03* 
change in international reserves (t-1)  0.01** -0.003  0.005  0.02*  0.02
o -0.01** 0.00 -0.02**
current account balance (in percent of GDP, t-1)  -0.03  0.002  0.003  -0.04
o 0.01 -0.003 -0.01 -0.01
new net IMF credit (in percent of quota, t-1)  -0.001
o 0.004** 0.00 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.003
o 0.01
log likelihood  -148.52  -145.38 -137.42 -93.46 -75.68 -224.86 -99.42 -117.29
number of countries  19  19  19  19  18  19  17  18 
number of observations  92  92  91  92  85  92  83  90 
 
Notes: 
z-statistics in parentheses 
Levels of significance: 1 percent (*), 5 percent (**), 10 percent (
o)    30 
Table 5: Targets and Instruments (panel data, 1997-2003, 141 observations, OLS) 
                          dependent variables 
 
independent variables 






I.  all conditions (t-1)  -0.04  -0.001  0.07*  0.11  -0.002 
R-squared            0.73 0.29 0.65 0.14 0.93
II.  monetary conditions, total (t-1)  0.01  -0.01  0.10**  0.07  -0.02
o 
R-squared 0.72          0.29 0.64 0.12 0.94
III.  public sector conditions, total (t-1)            -0.11 0.09 0.25* 0.44 -0.02
R-squared 0.72          0.29 0.65 0.14 0.94
IV.  performance criteria, total (t-1)  0.20  -0.10  -0.06  0.67  0.04 
  structural benchmarks, total (t-1)  -0.05  0.006  0.08*  0.07  -0.004 
  prior actions, total (t-1)  -0.13  0.07  -0.25
o      0.16 0.05
R-squared            0.72 0.29 0.70 0.15 0.94
V.  performance criteria, monetary (t-1)  0.95
o         0.39 -0.63 -0.71 0.01
  performance criteria, public (t-1)  0.34  0.12  0.15  1.37  -0.02 
  structural benchmarks, monetary (t-1)  -0.01  -0.03  0.09**  0.11  -0.02** 
  structural benchmarks, public (t-1)  -0.25  0.08  0.32**  0.09  0.01 
  prior actions, monetary (t-1)  0.56  0.03  -0.10  1.37  0.39 
  prior actions, public (t-1)  -0.58  -0.02  0.13  0.44  -0.15 
R-squared 0.73          0.30 0.67 0.15 0.95
 
Notes: New net IMF credit, exhaustion of IMF quota (t-1), inflation (t-1), real GDP growth (t-1) and the lagged endogenous variable are included in 
all regressions. 
Panel corrected standard errors used.   31 
Table 6: Number of IMF Conditions (panel data, 1997-2003, poisson, instrumented, fixed effects) 
  all conditions  structural benchmarks 
        total monetary  monetary public  public total
world bank adjustment loans  0.47*  0.47**  -0.29  0.63*  0.43  -1.30
o 
world bank other loans  -0.05  -0.06  0.13  -0.10
o     
   
           
         
   
           
-0.19
o 0.03
world bank technical loans  0.06  -0.05  0.21  0.30  -0.43  1.07
o 
real GDP  -0.02**  -0.02  -0.03  -0.07*  -0.05*  -0.08
o 
real GDP growth (t-1)  -0.01  -0.01  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.08** 
real per capita GDP growth in OECD countries (t-1)  0.43*  0.61**  0.08  0.94*  0.97
o -0.40
LIBOR (t-1)  0.16**  0.20  -0.04  0.10  0.22  0.10 
government consumption (in percent of GDP, instrumented)  -0.16*  -0.19*  -0.05  -0.36*  -0.53*  -0.51* 
government budget deficit (in percent of GDP, instrumented) -0.10** -0.10 0.25 -0.02 0.06 0.86**
monetary expansion (percent, instrumented)  0.02*  0.01
o 0.03* 0.002 -0.01 0.03**
change in international reserves (instrumented) -0.02*  -0.01 0.02  -0.02*  -0.01  0.06
o 
current account balance (in percent of GDP, instrumented)  0.03
o 0.01 0.004 0.05
o 0.06 0.02
new net IMF credit (in percent of quota, t-1)  0.00  -0.00  0.004  0.001  -0.00  0.004 
log likelihood  -228.04  -139.36  -138.40  -190.35  -95.28  -98.56 
number of countries  19  19  19  19  17  17 
number of observations  92  90  90  90  82  86 
 
Notes: 
z-statistics in parentheses 
Levels of significance: 1 percent (*), 5 percent (**), 10 percent (
o)    32 
Table 7: Targets and Instruments (panel data, 1997-2003, 141 observations, 2SLS, fixed effects) 
                          dependent variables 
 
independent variables 







I.  all conditions (t-1)  0.19  -0.01  -0.05  -0.47  -0.004 
R-squared        0.51  0.10 0.04  0.24 0.28
II.  monetary conditions, total (t-1)  0.13  0.11  -0.06  -0.96
o    -0.02
R-squared 0.50  0.07        0.05 0.25 0.29
III.  public sector conditions, total (t-1)  -0.12  -0.38  -0.06  -1.08  0.03 
R-squared 0.48  0.01        0.05 0.27 0.27
IV.  performance criteria, total (t-1)  0.09  -0.70  0.01  3.26  0.14 
  structural benchmarks, total (t-1)  0.20  0.07  -0.07  -0.64
o    -0.01
  prior actions, total (t-1)  1.03
o      0.26 -0.002  0.93  -0.02
R-squared          0.45  0.01 0.05 0.18 0.27
V.  performance criteria, monetary (t-1)  -2.99  0.53  0.30  -3.62  -0.25 
  performance criteria, public (t-1)  -0.80  -0.14  0.004  0.83  0.08 
  structural benchmarks, monetary (t-1)  0.40
o        0.13 -0.03 -0.62  -0.02
  structural benchmarks, public (t-1)  -0.42  -0.36  -0.21  -2.32  0.01 
  prior actions, monetary (t-1)  -1.83  0.43  3.50  -12.56  -0.48 
  prior actions, public (t-1)  2.27  -1.01  -0.88  0.31  0.04 
R-squared 0.40  0.01        0.02 0.15 0.29
 
Notes: New net IMF credit, exhaustion of IMF quota (t-1), inflation (t-1), real GDP growth (t-1) and the lagged endogenous variable are included in 
all regressions. 
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Appendix: Descriptive Statistics and Data Sources 
Variable  Data Source  Mean  Std. Dev. 
World Bank adjustment   www.worldbank.org  0.15  14.95 
    loans       
World Bank other loans  www.worldbank.org  0.57  0.96 
World Bank technical loans  www.worldbank.org  0.05  0.22 
GDP (billion US$, real)  IMF (2003)  18.74  53.83 
GDP growth rate  IMF (2003)  1.65  12.00 
real per capita GDP growth in     
    OECD countries 
OECD (2003)  0.61  0.38 
LIBOR IMF  (2003)  4.53  1.84 
Government consumption  IMF (2003)  15.18  5.60 
    (in percent of GDP)       
Government budget deficit  IMF (2003)  11.72  148.84 
    (in percent of GDP)       
Monetary expansion (percent)  IMF (2003)  19.81  27.54 
Change in international reserves IMF (2003)  3.85  20.76 
    (percent)       
Current account balance  IMF (2003)  -45.37  599.82 
    (in percent of GDP)       
Change in IMF liabilities   IMF (2003)  0.39  55.51 
    (percent of Quota)   
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
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Figure 4 
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